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"Son of Sam" and His Legislative Offspring:
The Constitutionality of Stripping Criminals
of Their Literary Profits
Alan Young*

We have seen in recent years a growing demand to recognize the victims'
rights and needs. In Canadian jurisdictions this has resulted in the introduction of
victims-witness assistance programs that are designed to provide support to a
victim of crime throughout the court process. Compensation boards have also
been set up to provide financial remuneration w those who have suffered injury or
loss at the hands ofthe perpetrator ofthe crime. In the United States, however, a
more aggressive scheme for providing victim redress has been adopted by a
number of the state legislatures. These "Son of Sam" laws, named for the
convicted New York killer David Berkowitz, operate to confiscate profits repead by
offenders who choose to recount their criminal exploits.
The author examines the development ofthese laws in the United States and
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of such a scheme in the Canadian
legal context. This discussion turns on the proposition that royalty stripping
violates the right to freedom of expression, subject to the reasonable limit clause
found in section I of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Three potential
arguments under clause 1are discussed in detail: institutional restrictions necessitated by incarceration; victims' rights to receive compensation; and the principle
of unjust enrichment. The author concludes that the "Son of Sam" laws have a
disproportionate effect on freedom of expression and that they are not the best
vehicle for furthering victims' rights.
Depuis quelques annees, nous avons assiste a une demande accrue pour la
protection des interets et des besoins des victimes d'actes criminels. Au Canada,
plusieurs gouvernements ont adopte des programmes d'aide et de soutien pour les
victimes appe/ees atemoigner. De plus, des organismes d'indemnisation ont vu le
}our afin d'offrir des compensationsfinancieres aux personnes qui ont ete victimes
de blessures ou de pertes matt!rielles. Par ailleurs, aux Etats- Unis, un systeme
beaucoup plus agressif afin d'aider pareilles victimes a t!te t!labore par certains
etats. Ces lois, surnommees "lois dufils de Sam" d'apres le nom du meurtrier
new-yorkais David Berkowitz, visent ii. conJisquer /es profits realises par !es
criminels qui choississent de devoiler leurs activites illicites.
*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
© 1988 Alan Young.
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L'auteur etudie /'elaboration de ces lois aux Etats- Unis et discute des avantages et des inconvenients qui resulterait de !'adoption de lois sirnilaires au
Canada. I! aborde la question de savoir si l'enlevement de royautes violerait le
droit a la liberte d'expression garanti par la Charte canadienne des droits et
libertes et sujet ala clause limitative prevueason article 1. Certainsdes arguments
pouvant ltre developpes sous /'article 1 sont etudies en detail: restrictions institutionnelles requises par !'incarceration, droit de la victime de recevoir compensation etprincipede l'enrichissement sans cause. L'auteur conclut queces loisont un
ejfet disproportionne sur la liberte d'expression et qu'elles ne sont pas le meilleur
moyen afin de faire avancer la cause par !es droits des victimes.

1. INTRODUCTION
Since the emergence in the 1930s ofvictimology as a scholarly
and academic field of study, 1 there has been a growing public
concern with the plight of victims of crime. It became increasingly
apparent that the public law characterization of the criminal process as a battle between state and accused resulted in the relegation
of the victim to the role of a mere witness in the process with no
recognizable interest in the outcome. In response to this problem,
most countries enacted legislation to provide for compensation or
reparation to victims. The compensation schemes found in various
jurisdictions have different formulations, but two elements are
common to all. First, as an adjunct to the sentencing process,
convicted offenders may be ordered to pay compensation for property loss and out-of-pocket expenses. Second, if the offender is not
apprehended or convicted, there exists state-sponsored compensation administered by government agencies. The provision of compensation from public funds usually allows for awards that are not
restricted to property loss but include compensation for more
intangible losses such as pain and suffering.
Despite the best intentions of governments, many of these
compensation schemes have been roundly criticized as being little
more than token efforts to appease victims. 2 It has been argued that

the state-sponsored schemes are too restrictive in scope and too
parsimonious in their awards, and that this problem is aggravated
b~ the fact that in most cases it is futile to seek compensation
dlfectly from the offender because most offenders are destitute. In
!hi~ p~p~r, w~ will exa~ine the novel approach adopted by many
J:1nsd1.ct10ns m the United States to facilitate obtaining compensat10n dtrectly from the offender. In the late 1970s state legislatures
became enamoured with the idea of confiscating profits reaped by
offenders who chose to write books describing their criminal exploits. The idea was to strip criminals of their royalties and to
redistribute these funds to victims.
Affectionately known as "Son of Sam "3 laws, these confiscatory schemes have been applauded by some and condemned
by others. The major source of discontent has been the belief that
depriving offenders of part of the protective value of copyright in
their books will deter criminal authors from writing, and society
will lose the valuable criminological and sociological insights that
these books are assumed to contain. As might be expected, this
belief has crystallized into the constitutional claim that restrictions
on publishing these crime stories are a violation of the offender's
right to free expression and the public's corresponding right to
receive information. There can be little doubt that the marketplace
of ideas will be impaired if royalty stripping does effectively deter
writing, but this in itselfdoes not require the conclusion to be drawn
that these schemes are unconstitutional. As with most constitutional questions, the courts must perform a delicate balancing of
competing rights and interests, and in this case the right to free
expression collides with public demands that victims be accorded
due respect and adequate assistance.
. .In Canada, the issue of victims' rights has been the subject of
s1gmficant law reform efforts. 4 In addition, Parliament has recently
3.

l.

2.

F~r

a discussion of the rise of vict.imol_ogy, see R. Elias, The Politics of
Victzmzzatwn (Oxford: Oxford Umvers1ty Press, 1986); I. Drapkin & E.
Viano, eds., Victimology (Lexington: Lexington Press, 1974).
See R. Elias, "Community Control, Criminal Justice and Victim Services"
in E-, Fattah, ed., From Crime Policy to Victim Policy (New York: St.
Martm's Press, 1986); P. Burns, Criminal Injuries Compensation (Vancouver: Butterworths, 1980).
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4.

This epithet is a reference to the serial killer David "Son of Sam" Berkowitz
wh_o's_case prompted t~e New York Legislature to enact the first profitstnppmg statute. See discussion in R. Inz, "Compensating the Victims
from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story
The Constitutionality of the
New York Approach" (1978), 14 Colum. J. L. & Social Problems 93.
Ii: l ?83 a Fe~eral/Provincial Task Force was set up to report on the status of
v1ctims of cnme-: F_ederal Provincial Task Force on Justice for Victims of
Crime (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1983). The most signifi-
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introduced legislation to confiscate the fruits of crime. 5 The combined interest in victims' rights and legislative reform designed to
ensure that offenders do not profit from their wrongdoing suggests
that lawmakers in Canada may be interested in adopting the American "Son of Sam" approach. In light of this possibility, whether
remote or impending, this paper will discuss the constitutional
obstacles to enacting this type oflegislation. The paper will begin by
examining the development of these laws in the United States
before turning to a discussion of the potential infringement of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). 6 On the
assumption that a cogent argument can be made that royalty
stripping violates the right to free expression, it will be necessary to
examine the applicability of the reasonable limit clause found in
section 1 of the Charter. Three potential claims will be examined
with reference to section 1 of the Charter: that stripping criminals
of book profits is a reasonable limit upon the right to free expression
because this right is outweighed by (1) institutional restrictions
upon the rights of prisoners as necessitated by the exigencies of
incarceration; (2) the right of victims to receive compensation for
losses occasioned by crime; and (3) the principle of unjust enrichment - that no one should profit from their wrongdoing. It is
hoped that this examination will show that Son of Sam laws are illconceived and not a welcome addition to the well-founded objective of compensating victims of crime.

stem from something as basic as an inherent human interest in the
struggle of good and evil, or the crime story may engage a more
subtle and sophisticated interest in trying to understand the nature
of defiance and rule-breaking. For whatever reason, stories ofcrime
provide valued entertainment for many.
Since there is a large and available commercial market for the
sale of books regarding the exploits of criminals, it is not surprising
that many people try to profit from publishing stories of sensational
crimes. No one is immune from the lure of profit: in the eighteenth
century even prison chaplains could amass considerable profits
from publishing the last confessions of criminals awaiting execution. 7 As would be expected, criminals sentenced to lengthy prison
sentences might find it profitable to spend their interminable days
flexing new-found literary muscles in the hope of accumulating
substantial royalty payments that would be available to them upon
release from prison.
In 1977, with the conviction of the notorious serial killer
David Berkowitz (also known by the alias "Son of Sam"), the New
York legislature was spurred into action when it became known
that Berkowitz might collect large profits from a contract he entered into for the publication of his account of his murders. Senator
Emmanuel Gold sponsored a bill designed to strip the criminal
author of the profits he expected to receive upon publication. The
Senator stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense ofjustice and decency that an individual, such
as the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money
for his story once he is captured - while five people are dead, other people
injured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all
criminal situations the victim must be more important than the criminal. 8

2. CRIMINAL AUTHORS AND THE AMERICAN
APPROACH
Since the advent of print, there has been no shortage of published crime stories. The publishing industry is eager to pander to
our fascination with the dramatic content of crime, and we consume these crime stories with great passion. Our fascination may

5.
6.

cant development has been the introduction of a bill in Parliament to
integrate victims into many aspects of the criminal justice system: Bill
C-89, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime), 2nd Sess.,
33rd Parl., 1986-87-88.
Bill C-61, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Food and Drugs Act and
the Narcotics Control Act, 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl., 1986-87.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11.
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Since the initiative taken in New York, over 20 states have
enacted laws to prevent criminals from profiting from publication
contracts. 9 Before turning to the mechanics of these statutory
7.
8.
9.

P. Linebaugh, "The Ordinary ofNewgate and His Account," in J. Cockburn, ed., Crime in England 1550-1880 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977).
Memorandum ofSenator Emanuel Gold, 1977 New York State Legislative
Annual, p. 267.
For complete citations to all existing statutes, see "Publication Rights
Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the Problem"
{1983), 68 Cornell L. Rev. 686 at 687, note 6.
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schemes, it must be mentioned that the Son of Sam incident was
merely a catalyst for the regulation of a problem that had attracted
public attention long before the arrival of Son of Sam. In the
United States there are fewer restrictions on the form and structure
of lawyers' retainers, and many clever attorneys realized that in
cases of sensational criminal events they could secure payment of
their fees by having the criminal assign his interest in any future
publication contract. Whatever the ethical implications of these
attorney-client life story fee agreements, 10 it became an accepted
practice to use fee contracts that gave the attorney exclusive rights
to a client's life story.
Famous examples of these fee contracts are readily found. The
convicted murderer of Martin Luther King, James Earl Ray, is
known to have directed payment of at least $40,000 in royalties to
his attorneys for the publishing of the story of his crime. 11 One
member of the Manson family, Susan Atkin, who was convicted of
the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate and others, directed payment of
$52,500to her attorney and$131,250 toa trust for her son's benefit
in exchange for an interview describing her involvement in the
murder. 12 The possibility of realizing upon the profits of criminal ·
authors has resulted in American lawyers exploiting this newfound source of wealth.
The recent case in California of the "Skid Row Stabber" 13
illustrates the dangers of allowing lawyers to encourage clients to
tum their crimes into publishing profits. In 1979 Bobby Joe Maxwell was charged with four counts of robbery and ten counts of
murder. The indigent accused was only able to obtain the services
of private counsel by means of a life story fee contract. Under the
contract, the lawyers stood to gain 8 5 per cent ofthe net proceeds of
any future publishing or film contract. Realizing that the contract
10. For a discussion of the ethical implications of these arrangements, see L.
Higgins, "Ethics - A Proposal for Judicial Condemnation of AttorneyClient Life Story Fee Arrangements" (1984), 6 West New England L. Rev.
851.
11. J. Rothman, "In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problem of the
Offender as Author" (1980), J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 255, note 2.
12. Ibid.
13. The accused was called the "Skid Row Stabber" after being charged ·with
the deaths of 10 skid row derelicts in Los Angeles between Oct. 1978 and
Jan. 1979. See discussion in Higgins, note 10, above, at pp. 853-857.
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placed them in a position of conflict of interest, in that the lawyers
might be seen as compromising the defence in order to increase
book sales, the lawyers included in the retainer an express description of the potential conflicts of interest so that the client could
effectively make an informed waiver of his right to have a conflictfree attorney. The contract outlined three potential areas of
conflict:
1. the lawyers may have an interest to create publicity, which
would increase the money that they might get as a result of
this agreement, even if this publicity hurt Maxwell's
defence;
2. the lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain defences that would question the sanity or mental capacity of
Maxwell, because to raise these defences might make this
agreement between the lawyers and Maxwell void or
voidable by Maxwell;
3. the lawyers may have an interest in having Maxwell convicted and even sentenced to death so that there would be
increased publicity, which might mean that the lawyers
would get more money as a result of this agreement. 14
Iflawyers in America have no shame in admitting it is possible
that they will not vigorously oppose the death penalty for their
clients in order to realize greater profits from book sales, then,
assuming that such disreputable conduct is a product of greed,
there can be little doubt that there exists enormous potential for
profit from criminal authors. The Son of Sam case was not a unique
instance of criminal profiteering but is just the tip of the iceberg. In
New York, the Crime Victims Board has already seized advances
or royalties in seven cases, with the largest seizure being a sum of
$100,000 paid by Warner Brothers to John Wojtowicz, whose 1972
bank robbery became immortalized in the film Dog Day Afternoon.
This money was ultimately distributed to the four bank employees
who had been held hostage during the incident, to defence lawyers
14. These are the exact terms of the contract as taken from .Maxwell v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles Cty., 639 P. 2d 248 at 261 (1982). The upshot of the
case was that the accused had knowingly waived his right to complain about
his lawyer's conflict of interest.
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and to the offender's former wife. 15 Stripping criminals ofliterary
profits can evidently uncover sizeable sums that can be redistributed to victims.
Most jurisdictions that have adopted a statutory scheme for
the stripping of literary profits have closely followed the original
plan advanced in New York. 16 The common features of these
schemes are as follows:

civil suits that are brought against the offender. By judicial construction, any statutory limitation periods begin to run only from
the time the escrow account is established and not from the usual
starting point of when the cause of action has arisen. 18
Any divergencies in these statutes concern the mode of distributing the funds in the escrow account at the end of the five-year
period. There are three basic methods of distribution.

1. anyone who contracts with a person accused or convicted
of a crime with respect to the re-enactment of the crime by
way of book, magazine, record or film, or with respect to
the expression of the accused's thoughts or feelings about
the crime by way of book etc., is required to deposit the
proceeds from such contract with an administrative
agency that is responsible for administering victim compensation schemes;

1. Type 1 - All victims with outstanding civil judgments are
given a pro rata share of the proceeds and any remaining
funds are returned to the offender. 19
2. Type 2 - Funds are distributed to various different classes
of individuals in addition to distribution to victims. In
Florida, for example, funds are distributed as follows: 25
per cent to dependents of the accused; 2 5 per cent to
victims and their dependants to the extent of their
damages as ascertained by the Court; 50 per cent to the
state for its costs in prosecuting and incarcerating the
offender; any remaining funds are then returned to the
offender. 20

2. any funds deposited are held in escrow for five years;
3. the administrative agency is required periodically to post
notices in newspapers of general circulation to notify victims that these funds may be available;
4. any victim who has obtained judgment in a civil proceeding against the offender may apply to the Board for release
of money held in the escrow account to satisfy the
judgment.
It should be noted that, if an accused person is acquitted, most
jurisdictions require that the funds in the escrow account be returned to the offender; however, some jurisdictions contain a puzzling provision that allows for this money to be forfeited to the
state. 17 In addition, most jurisdictions allow for the convicted
offender to apply periodically for release of some of the money for
the purpose of paying attorney fees or to satisfy orders of compensation or restitution that are made at the time of sentencing. lt is
interesting to note that courts have interpreted these schemes to
extend any statutory limitations that victims face with respect to
15. S. Roberts, "Criminals, Authors and Criminal Authors," March 3, 1987,
N.Y. Times Book Review, pp. I, 34.
16. N.Y. Exec. Law, ss. 620-635 (Mc.Kinney 1982).
17. See, e.g., Ala. Code, s. 41-9-82.

3. Type 3 - Funds are distributed to victims exclusively, or
to different classes of individuals or groups in designated
shares, and any remaining funds are forfeited to the state. 21
It is important to distinguish between these three types of
distribution because they may have distinct constitutional implications. Ifthe temporary deprivation of access to publishing profits is
a violation of freedom of speech, it is necessary under both American and Canadian jurisprudence to determine whether there is a
pressing or compelling state interest that outweighs the societal
interest in free expression. The type 1 mode of distribution is
evidently directed exclusively towards assisting victims, and one
would then balance victims' rights against free speech. Under types
2 and 3, it is unclear whether the legislation is premised upon
18.
19.
20.
2L

Barrett v. Wojtowitz, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (1978).
See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law, s. 632-a.
Fla. Stat., s. 944.512 (Supp. 1979).
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., s. 13-4202(D)-(E) (1978) and Ala. Code, s.
41-9-82 (Supp. 1981).
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victims' rights, or whether this concern is only incidental to a
notion of forfeiture based upon the principle that no one should be
permitted to profit from the wrong. If the latter interpretation is
right, then the issue is far more confusing, as it would be necessary
first to ask whether literary profits are profits from crime or
whether they are too indirectly connected to the crime to fall within
the principle. If the connection is determined to be direct and not
conceptually remote, then it would be necessary to balance the
common-law principle of unjust enrichment against free speech.
Before one em barks upon an analysis of the constitutionality
of these schemes, it should be noted that from one perspective this
entire issue is just a tempest in a teapot. In actuality these schemes
do not significantly modify the standard civil process for collecting
upon outstanding judgments. In order to trigger application of
these schemes, the victim still must successfully litigate his or her
claims, and the establishment of an escrow account merely facilitates execution of the judgment by freezing the offender's assets for
a period of five years. It is, however, misleading to assert that the
schemes are mere enhancers of ordinary civil procedure. At the
outset one must question why the decision to render execution of
civil judgments more effective is limited only to assets or profits
reaped from publishing. The establishment of escrow accounts
should logically apply to any windfall funds that the offender may
receive while incarcerated. Undoubtedly, the notoriety oflife story
fee contracts has highlighted the obvious fact that offenders can
reap enormous profits from the decision to publish, but this does
not justify the singling out of publishing profits as the only profits to
be made readily available to victims.
The second anomaly that runs counter to the characterization
of the scheme as a mere civil process enhancer is the fact that the
state, under some statutory formulations, is an actual beneficiary of
the profits. It is surely a rare occurrence for the state to have any
outstanding cause of action against an offender as a result of the
commission of the crime. The Son of Sam laws are thus not merely
technical reformulations of the rules of civil procedure. The critical
inquiry must revolve around whether profit stripping is tantamount to the silencing of an individual who deserves to be punished
but who nonetheless remains entitled to contribute to the marketplace of expressive activity.
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3. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The hallmark of any parliamentary democracy is the right of
citizens to engage freely in debate and other expressive activities.
This trite observation must be accompanied by another equally
trite one: that the freedom to engage in expressive activities is not
absolute and there will be numerous occasions when an overriding
public interest will justify restrictions on the right to speak. The
focus of this inquiry will be on the right of criminals to publish
materials describing their criminal exploits and the corresponding
right of citizens to receive this information. The controversial Son
of Sam laws not only affect the right of criminals to speak and the
right of citizens to receive, but also potentially infringe the right of
the press to collect and disseminate information freely. This latter
right will not be discussed, but it can be safely said that analyzing
the public interest in freedom of the press will engage the same
balancing considerations employed in analyzing the public's free
speech or expression interests.
Two distinct issues must be addressed in the analysis of
whether literary profit stripping violates section 2 of the Charter.
First, one must examine if the content of the speech deserves
constitutional protection. Content-based distinctions 22 carry the
danger of allowing state prioritization of our right to speak
However, it must be recognized that there are classes of speech that
have traditionally been excluded from constitutional protection,
and we need to know if profit-motivated descriptions of criminal
infliction of injuries are exempt from protection. Assuming that
these autobiographical crime stories are deserving of protection,
one must then address the second question: whether the scheme to
redistribute publishing profits impairs the exercise of the right to
free expression. It must be remembered that these schemes do not
prohibit speech directly; rather, they merely make the exercise of
speech less profitable. Does the removal of the potential for profit
deter the exercise of our rights, or is it merely an incidental burden
that the Charter will tolerate?
Although the analysis need not begin with an examination of
American jurisprudence, Canadian courts struggling in this for22. See discussion in G. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment
(1983), 25 William and Mary L.Rev. 189.
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mative period of Charter jurisprudence have found it helpful to
refer to and incorporate American case law. 23 At least at the level of
rhetoric, the Americans have elevated the right of free speech to the
position of a "preferred freedom". 24 The courts purport to safeguard this right zealously, believing that infringement offree speech
will surely bring about the downfall of the republic. The First
Amendment is designed "to secure the widest possible dissemination ofinformation from diverse and antagonistic sources"25 and to
"assure a society in which uninhibited, robust and wide open
debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only
in such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish. " 26 Whether or not the American courts have in practice extended the fullest protection to this right, anyone who seriously
contends that Son of Sam laws would violate the prescriptions of
the Charter must account for the fact that the American courts
have not yet impugned the integrity ofthese literary profit-stripping
schemes.
It is surprising that few people have attacked the constitutionality of these laws, and in fact the only case that seriously
discusses First Amendment concerns reached the conclusion that
these laws are constitutionally valid. In Fasching v. Kallinger, 27 the
New Jersey Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of a "type
2" New Jersey statute 28 requiring the depositing of publication
23. For cases approving of resort to American jurisprudence, see R. v. Carter
(1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 439 at 441, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 412 at 415 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Therens, [1983] 4 W.W.R. 385 at405, 5 C.C.C. (3d) 409 at 428 (Sask. C.A.);
Hunter, Dir. ofInvestigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch v.
Southam Inc., [1984) S.C.R. 145, 41 C.R. (3d) 97 (sub nom. Dir. ofInvestigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch v. Southam Inc.). It
should be noted that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution refers to freedom of speech and the Canadian Charter refers to freedom
ofexpression; presumably our formulation suggests a more expansive right,
but we will proceed on the assumption that there is no significant distinction in the formulation of the rights.
24. R. McKay, "ThePreferenceforFreedom"(l959), 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1182.
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 49 (1976).
26. Ibid., p. 93, note 127.
27. 510 A. 2d 694 (1986).
28. N.J. Stat. Ann. Title 52:48-26. The New Jersey statute contains a "type 2"
mode of distribution in that the funds are distributed in the following
priority: I) to satisfy the civil judgments of victims; 2) to satisfy a court
order ofrestitution; 3) to offset reasonable costs incurred by the board in
administering the statute.
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profits from the book The Shoemaker in an escrow account. The
book is an examination of the background and behaviour of the
convicted murderer Joseph Kallinger. 29 The publisher contracted
with Kallinger to provide him with 12 per cent of the profits
received by the author in exchange for Kallinger's provision of
information to the author. Kallinger in tum assigned his rights to
the contract to his attorney.
The defendant argued that the scheme violated the First
Amendment in that it inhibited the publication oflegitimate studies of the criminal mind by removing the economic incentive that
may prompt criminals to co-operate in providing necessary information. The court's response focused on the proposition that the
statute does not directly and completely prohibit speech as it is a
reasonable "time, place and manner" restriction. 30 Those writers
who want to publish studies of the criminal mind are still permitted
to do so by ensuring that the story does not constitute a re-enactment of a particular crime, or by ensuring that any re-enactment
does not engage the services of the offender. If the writer finds these
alternatives unacceptable, he or she may still publish the works
with the only restriction being that the offender will have to forfeit
his proceeds.
The Court funher reasoned that, if the restrictions were tantamount to an impairment of the right, then the impairment was
justified on the basis that the state had a compelling interest in
preventing criminals from profiting from crime and that this statute was narrowly drawn to achieve this pressing objective. In
addition, the Court believed that this was a case of mere commercial speech that would not be afforded the full protection ofthe First
Amendment. This decision was ultimately reversed on other
grounds and the appellate court found no reason to tum to the First
Amendment considerations. 31
Books and films that describe the background and behaviour
of offenders are undoubtedly properly classified as forms of ex29. For a discussion of the Kallinger case, see A. Cartwright, "Crime Doesn't
Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit From A Criminal's Story"
(1987), 55 Cincim:iaJiL.Rev. 831.
30. Ibid., p. 838.
31. Note27,above.
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pression; however, many believe that freedom of expression is
limited to freedom of useful expression. Although the constitutional guarantee does not draw a distinction between useful and
useless expression, this distinction has been grounded on the view
that rights of free speech are political rights that must be respected
in order to maintain an open society based upon representative
democracy. Accordingly, if the speech in question does not serve
the purpose offurthering political debate, then it is a form of speech
deserving less, or even no, protection. As Meiklejohn says:
The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government. .. .It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage .... The
guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly,
upon issues with which voters have to deal - only, therefore, to the
consideration of matters of public interest. 32

Accordingly, the American courts have been comfortable in
assigning priorities to various forms of speech: political speech
deserves the fullest protection, non-political speech deserves less
protection, and speech devoid of social value is altogether excluded
from the First Amendment. 33 The view that free speech interests
merely serve political interests has been criticized as failing to take
into account the true nature of freedom and its importance in
developing respect for the autonomy and self-actualization of the
individual. 34 A less restrictive view of the purp'ose offree expression
sees four potential values in protecting rights of expression:
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance of a
system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual s~lf
fulfillment, (2) as a means ofattaining the truth, (3) as a method of secunng
participation by the members of the society in social, including political,

32. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers ofthe People
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 27, 79.
.
33. For example, the United States Supreme Court has excluded certam classes
of speech from the protection of the Constitution: "the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words": Beauharn.ais
v. Illinois, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952). An example ofa class of speech deservmg
some protection, but not the full panoply, is commercial speech: see note
47, below.
34. T. Scanlon, "A Theory of Freedom of Expression" (1972), 1 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 204.

STRIPPING CRIMINALS OF THEIR LITERARY PROFITS

39

decisionmaking, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and
change. 35

The position of Canadian courts to date is difficult to ascertain. What they say seems to indicate a preference for the view that
free expression is concerned with political expression, but what
they have actually done is extend the protection to a variety of
expressive messages. In 1951 Rand J. noted on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada that "freedom in thought and speech and
disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every conceivable subject, are
of the essence of our life" [emphasis added]. 36 Despite the breadth
ofthis statement, the Ontario Court of Appeal is correct in asserting
that "the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have adopted the
rationale that freedom of expression is essential to the working of a
parliamentary democracy". 37 In the most significant post-Charter
case that discusses freedom of expression, the Dolphin Delivery
case, 38 the Supreme Court of Canada approved of earlier judicial
comments linking free speech with "matters of public policy and
public administration"39 and "political expression of the primary
condition of social life". 40
Aside from this rhetoric, it is illuminating to note that in the
Dolphin Delivery case the Court actually held that secondary picketing engages free expression interests because "picketers would be
conveying a message which at a very minimum would be classed as
persuasion, aimed at deterring customers from doing business with
the respondent". 41 The position that free expression extends far
beyond political debate is reflected in Canadian decisions that have
found Charter violations in laws that prohibit prostitutes from
communicating with customers, 42 and in the Criminal Code prohibition on the dissemination of obscene material. 43 Some of these
35. Emerson, "Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment" (1962-63),
72 Yale L.J. 877 at 878.
36. Boucher v. R., [1951] S.C.R. 265 at 288.
37. R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 129 at 148, 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 116 (Ont.
C.A.).
38. R. W.D.S. U., Loe. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1987] 1 W.W.R. 577.
39. Quoting from Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 326.
40. Ibid., p. 306.
41. Dolphin Delivery, note 38, above, at p. 588.
42. See, e.g., R. v. Skinner (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 137 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. Jahelka
(1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 164 (Alta. C.A.).
43. In R. v. Red Hot Video Ltd. (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 36 (B.C. C.A.), the Court
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cases have found that the Charter violation is a reasonable limit
under section 1 of the Charter, 44 but the consensus appears to be
that "freedom of expression is a right of everyone and is not limited
to debate of high principles or policy". 4 5
If the Charter protects solicitation by prostitutes, then it must
a fortiori extend to crime stories authored by criminals. It must be
beyond dispute that these stories or studies are not without redeeming social value, and that they contribute to valuable sociological
explorations. As one writer has noted:
As a general matter, the publication ofsuch works is desirable for a number
of reasons. They may communicate ideas and information to the public
that will inform debate on important questions. They may provide information that law enforcement agencies and criminologists would find
useful in combatting or studying crime. They may have the effect of
discouraging others from engaging in criminal conduct. They may have
literary or other artistic or cultural value. The process of creation may have
a rehabilitative effect on the authors. The fact that any particular work fails
to accomplish any or all of these objectives is not a reason for discouraging
publication of the entire genre. 46

The New Jersey Superior Court was probably well aware of
these social benefits, but it was unduly affected by the fact that the
criminal author would in most cases be more concerned with
publishing profits than with these social values. Whether or not this
is a correct assumption, it appears to have led the Court to conclude
that these publications fall into the category of commercial speech,
and thus are deserving of less protection. In the United States the
last decade has seen a judicial debate concerning the proper approach to valuing commercial speech, and the conclusion has been
reached that this form of speech is deserving of some lesser degree
of protection. 47 A similar debate has emerged in Canada: the
Ontario Divisional Court has concluded that commercial speech is
excluded from protection, 48 while the Quebec Court of Appeal

44.
45.
46.
4 7.
48.

assumed that obscene publications fell within the scope of s. 2 of the
Charter.
Jahelka, note 42, above, and Red Hot Video, note 43 above.
Skinner, note 42, above, at p. 159.
J. McCamus, "Recovery of the Indirect Profits of Wrongful Killing: The
New Constructive Trust and the Olson Case" (1985), 20 E.T.R. 165at173.
For a brief discussion of the American case law, see S. Braun, "Should
Commercial Speech Be Accorded Prima Facie Constitutional Recognition
UndertheCharterofRightsand Freedoms?" (1986), 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 37.
Re Klein and L.S. UC. (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 118.
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recently held that "there is no rule of interpretation that would
exclude commercial expression from freedom of expression". 49
There is no need to engage in a lengthy analysis of this debate,
because the characterization of crime stories as commercial speech
is wholly misconceived. This characterization is premised upon the
beliefthat an expressive message becomes commercial speech ifthe
sole motivation behind the expression is one of profit. Surely the
profit motive is irrelevant to the proper characterization of the
content of the speech. The critical factor in assessing the content of
speech is the public's right to know - a right that is assessed
independently of the motivation of the speaker. The public is
entitled to information that may be of value to it, and this entitlement is an implied component of the right to free expression:
The obverse of the concept of freedom of expression is the right of the
person to receive the message expressed; the right of the public and individuals to know what is being expressed by others with a message to
communicate applies equally to the democratic political process ... and as
in my opinion to the pit and thrust of economic competition in a free
market economy. 50

The potential for reaping profit from expression does not
convert expression into a less-protected commercial enterprise
because "no weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have
profited from the sale of publications" and "commercial activity,
in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment". 51 A form of expression
only becomes commercial expression that is deserving ofless protection when the message is "one which has as its purpose the
proposal of an economic transaction .... one which promotes or
attempts to entice a specific decision on the part of the recipient of
the message to agree to an economic exchange of money in return
for goods or services". 52 Commercial expression is a form of adver49. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.) (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 64ln.
50. Klein, note 48, above, at p. 129. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that
free speech includes a right to know in Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243
(1969).
51. Ginzburgv. U.S., 383 U.S. 463at474 (1966),quotedin Irwin Toy, note 49,
above, at p. 665.
52. R Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and the Charter" (1987), 37 U. ofT.
L.J. 229 at 230.
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tising or solicitation, but it does not embrace stories or studies
published with a view to profit.
The presence of the profit motive does, however, relate to
another aspect ofthe analysis of free expression. Assuming that this
form of speech is covered by section 2 of the Charter, one must ask
whether a literary profit-stripping scheme infringes upon this right.
It must be remembered that the legislation does not prohibit the
criminal from disseminating information concerning his behaviour; it merely makes this enterprise less profitable. The U.S.
Supreme Court has commented that "freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker", 53 and one must question the willingness of
a speaker who will speak only if he is given a guarantee of profit. In
an ideal world, all speakers would surely wish to contribute their
thoughts regardless of profit, but it is unrealistic to disregard the
strong influence of commercial motivations that exist in this world
and to restrict the right of free speech to those who are motivated
solely by noble aspirations.
It is obvious that "artistic or cultural expression very often has
a commercial purpose", 54 and that the denial of an opportunity to
profit will deter many speakers from engaging in the often arduous
enterprise of expressing themselves. In a case questioning the constitutionality of the Ontario Censor Board, an argument was advanced that a statutory scheme of prior restraint and censorship is
acceptable because it applies only to those who seek to exhibit films
in public for profit. The response of the Court is wo~h quoting in its
entirety:
Counsel for the Crown argued that the limits are reasonable since they
curtail only the freedom of those who wish to exhibit films to the P1;1blic or
for gain. He points out that any one can make films, show them pnvately,
rent them and sell them. Hence, it is said the freedom of expression is only
curtailed to the extent that a person wishes to exhibit film to the public or
for profit. It would be fair to assume that the prime purpose of1'.laking films
is to exhibitthem to the public. Ifa film-maker cannot show his film to the
public there is little point in making it. Moreover, the profi~ motive cannot
be a valid reason to prevent a film-maker from showmg his work, for one
who shows film for profit can have no less freedom of expression than one
who does so not for profit. The extent of freedom of expression cannot
53. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 at 756 (1976).
54. Irwin Toy, note 48, above, at p. 652.
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depend on that, for there is nothing wrong with making a profit from one's
art or one's ideas. 55

It may be argued that profit-stripping schemes do not have as
their purpose the restriction of free speech, but the Supreme Court
of Canada has made it perfectly clear that "both purpose and effect
are relevant in determining constitutionality". 56 If the effect of
removing the potential for profit is to deter publication, then the
scheme is unconstitutional. The relevant question is whether the
right is unduly burdened, and the Supreme Court has aptly noted
that "it matters not. . . whether a coercive burden is direct or
indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable".57 Restrictions on amounts of money that can be spent on
expressive activity have been recognized as unconstitutional. 58
Surely the converse is equally true: restrictions upon the amount of
money that can be earned through expressive activity unduly burden free speech. It would be difficult to verify statistically the
deterrent impact of Son of Sam laws, but it would be counterintuitive to assert that the laws do not create any disincentive to
publishing. American publishers have expressed their dissatisfaction with the operation of these laws, and there is at least one
documented example of a criminal author postponing the publication of her book as a direct result of these laws. 59
It thus appears that these laws do run counter to the guarantee
of free expression, and the next inquiry requires an examination of
55. Re Ont. Film & Video Appreciation Soc. and Ont. Bd. ofCensors(l983), 41
O.R. (2d) 583 at 591 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affinned45 O.R. (2d) 80 (Ont. C.A.).
56. R. v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321at350 (S.C.C.).
57. R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 759, 30 C.C.C. (3d)
385 at 418 (sub nom. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. R.). In a similar vein,
the U.S. Supreme Court has commented that "freedoms such as these ~re
protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from bemg
stifled by more subtle governmental interference": Bates v. Little Rock, 36 l
U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
58. Nat. Citizens' Coalition Inc.!Coafition Nationale des Citoyens Inc. v. A.G.
Canada, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 436 (Alta. Q.B.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l
(1976).
59. The Scarsdale Murderess, Jean Harris, has been advised to hold off publishing her account of the murder: see S. Clark, "The Son of ~am. Laws:
When the Lunatic, the Criminal, and the Poet are of Imagmat10n all
Compact" (1983), 27 St. Louis U. L.J. 297, 222; Roberts, note 15,above, at
p. 35.
-. ... /
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whether the restriction on the right is a reasonable limit under
section 1 of the Charter. Before turning to this issue, we should note
in passing the irony of the cqnclusion that a denial of profit is an
unconstitutional restriction on speech. The ability to profit from
one's literary labours is an incidental but inextricable part of the
protection provided by copyright laws that guarantee the author
the "sole right to produce or reproduce the work". 60 By concluding
that a stripping of literary profits is an unconstitutional burden
upon free speech, we have implicitly elevated copyright protection
to constitutional status; we move towards the American position
that "copyright is the engine of free expression". 61 The irony ofthis
development is that copyright has traditionally been viewed as
standing in an irreconcileable tension with the right to free expression. Allowing an author to possess exclusive rights to his or her
labour may encourage creative endeavours; however, the existence
of a monopoly over the dissemination ofinformation is contrary to
the public's right to receive and know. This tension has been
mediated in copyright law by the development of doctrines such as
fair use, or fair dealing, and the idea/expression dichotomy. 62 The
upshot of a ruling that Son of Sam laws violate the constitution is a
strengthening of the protection of copyright, and this strengthening
may be justified partially on the basis of the public's right to receive
information concerning crime, notwithstanding the traditional
concern that copyright may sometimes jeopardize the free flow of
information to the public. In analyzing the constitutionality of Son
of Sam laws, we are faced with the anomaly that the public's right
to know is presented as a justification for strengthening copyright
protection, even though this right to receive information has more
traditionally been seen as a reason for limiting the scope and
protection of copyright.
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4. SECTION I OF THE CHARTER AND THE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROFIT STRIPPING
Once it is established that Son of Sam laws do violate the
Charter it is incumbent upon the Crown to prove that this limitation up~n the right of free expression is a "reasonable limit that is
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The
Supreme Court of Canada has clearly established the test for a
showing that an infringement is justified:
Two requirements must be satisfied to establish that.a limi.t is rea.sonable
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. First, the
legislative objective which the limitati~n ~s designed. to i:iromo~ must be of
sufficient importance to warrant ovemdmg a constitutional nght. It must
bear on a "pressing and substantial concei:n". Secondly, th~ means chosen
to attain those objectives must be proport10nal or appropnate to the ends.
The proportionality requirement, in tu~, normally ~as three aspects: the
limiting measures must be carefully d~s1gned, ?r rat10nall;: connected, t.o
the objective· they must impair the nght as httle as possible; and their
effects must ~ot so severely trench on individual or group ri~ts that the
legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the
abridgement of rights. 63

Once this test is pruned of its redundancies, it is apparent that
there are two major concerns that must be addressed. First, the
Court must engage in a balancing exercise to determine ifthe state
objective outweighs the violated right. If the objective is of greater
importance, it will be upheld if, and only if, the legi~lative scheme
to implement the objective is narrowly drawn to achieve the stated
purpose. The critical question is then "wh~t alternative m~asures
for implementing the objective were available to the legislators
when they made their decisions". 64 With this framework in mind,
we will examine three possible justifications for profit-stripping: (a)
the status of being convicted of crime entails a corresponding loss of
rights; (b) unjust enrichment; and (c) victims' rights.
(a) CoJJateral Consequences of Conviction

60. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 30, s. 3.
61. D. Shipley, "Copyright & The First Amendment After Harper and Row v.
Nation Enterprises" (1986), Brigham Young U. L. Rev. 983 at 1024.
62. See H. Hoberman, "Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or
Monopoly of Expression" (1987), 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. 571; for a Canadian case in which the doctrine of fair dealing is discussed in the con text ofa
Charter challenge, seeR. v. James Lorimer & Co. (1984), 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262
(Fed. C.A.).

Confiscation of literary profits falls historically within the
powers that states have exercised to confiscate the property of
convicted felons. Two well-accepted claims have been advanced to
63. Edwards Books & Art, note 57, above, at p. 768 (S.C.R.), p. 425 (C.C.C.).
64. Skinner, note 42, above, at p. 160.
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justify this scheme. First, it was accepted that the prisoner forfeited
his entitlement to rights ordinarily held by citizens. Second, in
addition to this loss of status, it could be.said that the institutional
exigencies of incarceration required that most rights be suspended
or bestowed at the discretion of the prison administration. These
collateral consequences of conviction, which operate above and
beyond the designated punishment of incarceration, have come
under attack in the past two decades, with the result that one's
status as prisoner has been held not to outweigh one's right to free
expression.
Our penal heritage includes not only barbarous punishment,
but also a notion of civil death 65 that resulted in a corresponding
loss of political rights, the right to inherit or bestow inheritances,
and the loss of various legal rights including the right to sue. 66
Attendant upon conviction for a capital offence was the practice of
attainder, under which the offender forfeited all of his property to
the King. By the end of the nineteenth century the general forfeiture
of property upon conviction was abolished in Canada and England. 67 All that remained were specific and discrete forfeitures that
were_ triggered by proof of designated prerequisites (for example,
forfeiture of any conveyance proved to be used in the transportation of narcotics6s).
The abolition of civil death did not result in the elevation of the
prisoner to the status ofcitizen with his or her full panoply of rights.
Lawmakers still operated on the assumption that prisoners remained "slaves of the state"69 and, when prison litigation began to
flourish in the United States in the 1950s, the courts at first re65. See, M. Damaska, "Adverse Legal Consequences ofConviction" (1968) 59
J. of Crim. L., Criminology and Political Science 351; J. Gobert and' N.
Cohen, Rights ?f Prisoners (Colorado Springs: McGraw-Hill, 1981), para.
2.0 I. The provmce of Quebec retained a form of civil death until finally
abolished in 1971: S.Q. 1971, c. 84, s. 13.
66. Ironically, civil death also included immunity from lawsuit, which would
defeat the claims of victims.
67. In England, the State ceased the practice of forfeiture of the convicted
felon's property in 1870 with the enactment of33 & 34 Viet. c. 23, and in
Canada the concept of "corruption of blood" was abolished with the
enactment of our first Criminal Code in 1892.
68. Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, ss. 10-11.
69. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21Gratt)790 at 796 (1871).
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sponded by simply deferring to the decision of penal administrators. This deference eventually crystallized into the "handsoff" doctrine. 70 The Canadian judiciary followed the lead of American courts. They developed the position that they would not
review decisions made by prison administrators that affected substantive rights ofprisoners. The attitude ofthe Canadian courts was
reflected in the following pronouncement by the Ontario Court of
Appeal:
Since his right to liberty is for the time being non-existent, all decisions of
the officers ofthe Penitentiary Service with respect to the place and manner
of confinement are the exercise of an authority which is purely administrative, provided that such decisions do not otherwise transgress rights
conferred or preserved by the Penitentiary Act. 71

In other words, the classic position on prisoners' rights was
that they retained only rights that were specifically preserved by
statute; all other rights were forever abandoned during incarceration. However, in the United States, the due process revolution of
the Warren court in the 1960s had a significant impact upon
prisoners' rights, and slowly but surely the courts began to oversee
the decisions of prison administrators. In fact, every facet of prison
administration eventually came under constitutional scrutiny, and
the hands-off doctrine was replaced by an activist stance on the part
of the judiciary. Under the "totality of circumstances" doctrine, 72
the courts closely monitored prison conditions to determine if they
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. If anv violations were
detected, the courts were not reluctant to order affirmative relief
that extended as far as requiring the prisons to construct new
buildings, despite the fiscal pressures that state legislatures claimed
as an obstacle to constitutional compliance. 7 3
70. Gobert and Cohen, note 65, above, para. 1.02.

71. R. v. Institutional Head ofBeaver Creek Correctional Camp, [1969] I O.R.
373 at 379, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 545 at 551 (Ont. C.A.).
72. See Robbins and Buser, "Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement"
(1977), 29 Stan. L. Rev. 893; Forman, "The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Proscription: Evolving Standards of Decency" (1973), 19 Loyola L.
Rev. 81; Collins, "The Defence Perspective in Prison Conditions Cases," in
Robbins, ed., Prisoners and the Law (1985). Collins comments that "the
totality of prison conditions approach gave the bench license to evaluate
virtually every aspect of the prison, even though specific areas would be of
no constitutional significance if they were evaluated alone" (at 7-5).
73. See, e.g., Collins, note 72, above, at 7-4 to 7-S; Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 at 385 (1970).
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With respect to First Amendment rights, the courts operated
upon the new assumption that these rights were retained and could
only be curtailed upon a showing of institutional exigencies:
In the first amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison
inmate retains those first amendment rights that are not inconsistent with
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system. Thus challenges to prison restrictions t~at are asserted
to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analysed m terms of the
legitimate policies and goals of the ~rrect_ions system, to :whose custody
and care the prisoner has been committed m accordance with due process
eflaw. 74

Accordingly, the denial ofthe right of a prisoner to receive information or mere correspondence, or to correspond or write with a view
to publication, could be justified only if the state could show that
this denial was absolutely necessary for institutional security or if
the exercise of the right would be counter-productive to the rehabilitation of the prisoner. 75
Once again, the Canadian courts followed the lead of the
Americans. In the pre-Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
of Canada established that decisions of prison administrators were
subject to judicial review, 76 and that inmates retained all civil rights
except those expressly or implicitly removed by statute. 77 The
advent of the Charter further strengthened the status of prisoners as
rights-bearing citizens, and the position that rights may only be
curtailed on the basis of institutional necessity now appears well
entrenched:
Moreover, simply because remanded inmates retai1:1 certain co~st!tutional
rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to rest!'lct1ons and
limitations. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
74. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 at 822 (1974).
75. See Gobert and Cohen, note 65, above, at para. 4.05. In this section, the
authors discuss cases dealing with prisoners' writing for publication. For
the most part, inmates have been allowed to write and J?U?lish; ~o_wever,
there are examples given of institutions that ?:;tve proh1b1~ed wntm~ entirely, presumably on the basis that the wntmg is cons~dered anti-rehabilitative because it may glorify or justify the author's cnmes.
76. Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Bd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, 13
C.R. (3d) 1.
77. This proposition emerges implicitly from the case of So/osky v. R. ~19_79),
SOC.CC. (2d)495 (S.C.C.), in which theSupremeCourtplacedrestnctmns
upon the power of prison officials to censor inmate correspondences.
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considerations underlying our penal system.... [T]he maintaining of institutional security and preserving [of] internal order and discipline are
essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained
constitutional rights. 78

The focus of inquiry has now changed so that state officials
bear the burden of justifying Charter violations with respect to
offenders. The recent flurry of right-to-vote cases for prisoners79
indicates that it is now improper merely to assert that the loss of the
right is a collateral consequence of conviction: it must be shown
that the right to vote cannot be exercised because it will jeopardize
institutional security. Similarly, a prohibition on the publication of
books by inmates can be justified only if it raises security problems
or is counter-productive to inmate rehabilitation. Surely the passive and reflective nature of writing does not engage these dangers;
rather, it must contribute to security and rehabilitation.
Of course, the Son of Sam laws do not in themselves prohibit
writing; they merely prohibit the reaping of profit. Perhaps it could
be argued that allowing inmates to accumulate wealth will jeopardize security by engendering jealousy among poorer inmates and
will eventually lead to incidents of robbery and extortion within the
prison. This is unpersuasive because regulations exist that require
funds received by an inmate to be placed in an "inmate trust fund",
and such funds can only be accessed if the prison administration is
convinced that "the payment is calculated to assist in the reformation and rehabilitation of the inmate". 80 To accommodate the
needs of institutional security, the prison administrators are required to act as custodians of the prisoner's wealth. Even in this
limited position of control, there is judicial authority for the proposition that the administrators cannot violate the Charter in their
decisions concerning the disposition of funds accumulated by
inmates. 81
78. j\t/altby v. A.G. Sask. (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 153 at 173 (Sask. Q.B.).
79. See Re Jolivet (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (B.C. S.C.); Badger v. Manitoba
(A.G.) (1986), 39 Man. R. (2d) 107, 27 C.C.C. (3d} 158 (Man. Q.B.),
affirmed 29 C.C.C. {3d) 92, 39 Man. R. (2d) 230 (sub nom. Badger v.
Manitoba) (Man. C.A.); Levesque v. Canada (A.G.) (1985), 25 D.L.R. (4th}
184 (Fed. T.D.).
80. Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C. 1970, vol. xiii, c. 1251, s. 32.
81. Henry v. Commissioner of Penitentiaries, [1987] 3 F.C. 420 (Fed. T.D.).
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In summary, a literary profit-stripping scheme cannot be justi-

fied on the basis of the status of the criminal author. In another
context, the Federal Court has sensibly indicated that it is improper
to thwart the ability of convicted offenders to earn a livelihood; 82
the prisoner is not a slave of the state, nor should he or she be a
complete dependant of the state. Allowing the prisoner to gain selfsufficiency through a legitimate vocation is one of the best ways of
ensuring that this individual will succeed in reintegrating himself
into society upon release.
(b) Unjust Enrichment

The underlying premise of literary profit stripping may be to
give effect to the common-law principle that no one should profit
from their wrongdoing. The proposition is easily stated:
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage
of his own wrong ... or to acquire property by his own crime. These
maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal
law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes. 83

The most common application of this principle has been seen in
cases disallowing a murderer to claim any benefits flowing to him
under the victim's will. 84 Parliament intends to give statutory recognition to this principle through its proposed amendments to the
Criminal Code allowing for a stripping of all assets acquired
through the commission of designated crimes. 85
Where an inheritance or other benefit accruing from a preexisiting legal obligation between wrongdoer and victim is involved, or where the legislature prevents the retention of fruits of
crime, there is a direct causal link between the wrongful act and the
resultant benefit. In the context of a Son of Sam law, the connection
between the wrong and the benefit is attenuated: interposed between the wrong and the benefit is the lawful act of the criminal in
writing or contributing to writing, and, in fact, the benefit reaped is
82. Litwack v. National Parole Bd. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Fed. T.D.).
83. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 at 511-512 (1889).
84. See discussion in Fridman and McLeod, Restitution (Toronto: Carswell,
1982), pp. 561-564; Goff and Jones, The Law ofRestitution, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986), pp. 624-631.
85. Note 5, above.
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more directly connected to the literary efforts of the criminal. Of
course, there can be little doubt that the expectant profits from
publishing are in most cases realized solely as a result of the public
notoriety of the crime, and, in the absence of the intentional
infliction of injury upon a victim, the criminal would have likely
had little success in the highly competitive publishing industry.
The case law dealing with succession to property upon wrongful death draws a distinction between "rights dependent on and
rights independent of the criminal act". 86 In the context of these
profit-stripping schemes, this distinction is critical. There is
nothing problematic in denying an author the full protection of
copyright where the copyright owner's anticipated gain would flow
from an illegal act, 87 but re-enacting a crime in literary form is a
legal activity. Ifwe allow the principle that no one is to profit from
wrongdoing to apply where there is an attenuated connection between the wrongful act and the benefit, we end up doing indirectly
what cannot be done directly. As has already been shown, criminals
are no longer subject to a general civil disability upon conviction,
and "it might be suggested that the disabling of a criminal from
generating profit by subsequent and different conduct conflicts
with the policies underlying the abolition of attainder and
forfeiture". 88
The drawing of causal connections is a hazardous enterprise,
since a great deal depends upon the subjective perspective of the
observer. At a minimum, it could be said that the criminal's
wrongful act is a necessary condition for the realization of subsequent profit, in that the publication would not have come into
existence but for the crime. However, not all necessary conditions
can be considered in the determination of what constitutes the
cause of a given phenomenon: it would be the height of absurdity
86. Goff and Jones, note 84, above, at pp. 628-629.
87. See, e.g., Aldrich v. One Stop Video Ltd. (1987), 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 106 (B.C.
S.C.), in which the court denied a remedy for copyright infringement of
obscene material; see also, Snepp v. U.S., 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980), in which the
court ordered that the profits from a publication concerning the author's
employment with the C.I.A. were to be impressed with a constructive trust,
because the author published contrary to his contractual obligations with
the C.I.A..
88. McCamus, note 46, above, at p. 169.
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for a fire marshal to report to the press that a fire was caused by the
existence of oxygen and the presence of wood. Before the principle
of unjust enrichment can override the right of the criminal to free
expression, we must be able to say with some degree of certainty
that his profit is a direct consequence of his crime.
Consider the recent Canadian case of the serial killer Clifford
Olson. In 1981 the R.C.M.P. had reason to believe that Olson was
responsible for the deaths of 11 missing children. There was a
paucity of evidence and the police had yet even to recover the
missing bodies. In order to bring this case to a close and to resolve
the uncertainty of the parents of the missing children, the R.C.M.P.
arranged to pay $100,000 to Olson's dependants in exchange for
information relating to the whereabouts of the children. After the
conviction of Olson, the parents of the murdered children brought
an application to recover the $100,000, claiming unjust enrichment. The application was granted and the judge imposed a constructive trust upon the money for the benefit ofthe parents.89 The
decision was premised upon the principle that no one should be
able to claim a benefit accruing from their criminal acts.
On appeal, the B.C. Court of Appeal concluded that this was
not an appropriate case for applying a constructive trust as a
remedy for unjust enrichment. 90 The Court held that four requirements need be present for the invocation of this remedy: (1) an
enrichment; (2) a corresponding deprivation; (3) an absence of any
juristic reason for the enrichment; and (4) a causal connection, that
is, a clear link between the contribution and the disputed assets. 91
The trial judge believed that it was not necessary to show some
commensurability between the plaintiffs loss and the criminal's
gain, but the Court of Appeal disagreed:
In meeting that requirement, the plaintiffs must show that they were
deprived when the funds were paid to McNeney.... It is clear on th.e facts
ofthis case that the payment by the R.C.M.P. to McNeneywasnot made as
compensation for the deaths of the children. As I have indicated, it was
authorized by the Attorney-General primarily to obtain evidence to convict Olson of the murders of the children. The payments to McNeney did
not deprive the plaintiffs of money which, if it had not been paid to
89. Rosenfeldt v. Olson, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 502, 20 E.T.R. 133 (B.C. S.C.).
90. Rosenfeldt v. Olson, (1986] 3 W.W.R. 403 (B.C. C.A.).
91. Ibid., pp. 407-408.
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McNeney, would properly have been payable to the plaintiffs. Thus the
payment to McNeney did not result in any corresponding deprivation to
the plaintiffs.92

The same logic applies to the publication of crime re-enactments. It cannot be said that the criminal is being paid as compensation for the crime, nor can it be said that the victims are deprived
of money to which they are directly entitled. However, despite the
causation difficulties, there is admittedly something disconcerting
or even abhorrent about the criminal profiting from his literary
description ofhis deeds. Even so, assuming that the causal problem
is dismissed as overly formalistic, one must still contend with the
balancing problem of whether the principle of unjust enrichment
outweighs the right to free expression. The following argument
cannot be lightly dismissed:
While such profit does not appeal to one's sensibilities as particularly
praiseworthy, neither is the problem of a sufficient magnitude to qualify as
one of the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests [which] give
occasion for permissible limitation when First Amendment rights are
involved. 93

The principle that no one should profit from their crime is one
of variable application. It allows the Court to employ its equitable
jurisdiction to prevent an obvious miscarriage of justice. It is a
question of balancing equities, 94 and, as such, it is difficult to apply
the principle across the board to all cases in which the criminal
decides to write about his or her exploits. The injustice attending
blanket application ofthe principle has been given legislative recognition in England in a statute that allows for exemption from the
rule even in cases of wrongful death and inheritance. 9s Abstractly
92. Ibid.
93. B. Wand, "Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims• Rights v. Freedom of
Speech" (1979), 54 Indiana L.J. 443, 459.
94. See Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 All E.R. 742 (H.L.). At
750-751, Lord Diplock elaborates upon the maxim ex turpi causa non
oritur actio by commenting:
[T]he court's refusal to assert a right, even against the person who has
committed the anti-social act, will depend not only on the nature of
the anti-social act but also on the right asserted. The court has to
weigh the gravity of the anti-social act and the extent to which it will
be encouraged by enforcing the right sought to be asserted against the
social harm which will be caused ifthe right is not enforced.
95. Goff and Jones, note 84, above, at pp. 626-627.
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stated, the maxim accords with one's intuitive sense ofjustice, but
its application cannot be divorced from the particular facts of any
given case. A Son of Sam law is an overinclusive response that is not
narrowly tailored to the problem of unjust enrichment. The law
would apply equally to a book that graphically details every moment of the crime in every chapter, as well as a book in which there
is only a fleeting reference to the crime. The law further applies
equally to a book that glorifies the crime and one in which the
criminal author soundly condemns his prior condu~t. This overinclusive coverage is far from the necessary balancing of equities
that is required for invocation of the principle.
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, it was
held that the principle that no one should profit from wrongdoing
could not operate in disregard of the principle of the presumption
of innocence. 96 If this concern for preventing unjust enrichment
does not have sufficient weight to oust the presumption of inno:ence, then, quite apart from the problems of causation and overnclusion, how can it be said that it is weighty enough to override
he right to free expression? The balancing of principles and the
veighing of competing interests do not admit of mathematical
>recision, but, in this case, all considerations point in favour of
1pholding the constitutional right.
c) Victims' Rights
On November 6, 1987, the Minister of Justice, Ray
-Inatyshyn, explained at a press conference that the government
vas determined to increase the legislative protections of victims
'because the victim of crime is often a forgotten person in our
:riminal justice system". 97 Much ink has been spilt in the past
lecade over the plight ofthis forgotten participant in the criminal
Justice system9 8 resulting in numerous recent reforms. How the
96. R. v. Fleming, [1986] l S.C.R. 415, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 297.
97. R. Cleroux, "Sweeping Reforms Proposed in Payments to Crime Victims,"
6 Nov. 1987, The Toronto Globe and Mail, p. 2.
98. For sampling of the literature, see Elias, note l above; Fattah, note 2 above;
Victims' Right's Symposium" (1983-84), 11 Peppermne L. Rev. l-182.; J.
Hagan, Victims Before the Law: The Organizational Domination ofCriminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); E. Ziegenhagen, Victims, Crime
and Social Control (New York: Praeger, 1977); B. Galaway & J. Hudson,
eds., Perspectives on Crime Victims (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co., 1981).
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victim happened to become an invisible participant is not entirely
clear, but it is true that the machinery of justice added insult to
injury by excluding the victim from the process.
Historically, all crimes were indistinguishable from torts. The
emergence of a conception of crime as a state concern did not
initially impair the ability ofthe victim to seek compensation in the
criminal proceedings. In fact, the fundamental premise of prosecution of crime in England was that it was to be initiated and brought
to completion by the complainant, and the notion of public prosecution by state officials that began officially in the late nineteenth
century was viewed as an exception to the rule of private prosecution. 99 Eventually prosecution by state officials became the norm,
but the lingering belief that the system was premised upon private
prosecution blinded the state to the fact that, slowly but surely, the
victim was being squeezed out of all consideration. This development should be contrasted with the situation on the Continent,
where it was readily accepted that prosecution by the state was the
proper response to crime. The open acceptance of the exclusion of
the victim from the prosecutorial process forced the state to develop other mechanisms for victim satisfaction. In France, for
example, there developed the practice of the action civile, in which
the victim was allowed to join his civil claim to any ongoing state
prosecution. 100
The enactment of Son of Sam laws is another response to the
plight of victims. These laws are designed to supplement existing
compensation schemes by ensuring that the criminal's windfall
publishing profits are not dissipated and are thus made readily
available to satisfy the civil judgments of victims. If the state
purports to justify the infringement of free expression rights on the
basis ofthe compelling and pressing interest in assisting victims, it is
importantto note thatthisjustification will only apply to a "type 1"
mode of distribution, in which the victims have exclusive rights to
the funds existing in the escrow account, with any remaining funds
99. For a brief description of the evolution of the role of the public prosecutor,
see Law Reform Commission of Canada, Private Prosecutions (1986), pp.
33-37.
100. P. Campbell, "A Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Procedures
in France and The United States" (1979-80), 3 Hastings Int'l and Comparative L Rev. 321 at 323-332.
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being returned to the offender. Any other mode of distribution that
allows other creditors, or the state itself, to share in the distribution
of proceeds cannot be justified on the basis of the pressing state
concern with victim assistance.
Atthe outset, one must question the need for a profit-stripping
scheme in the light of existing compensatory schemes. At the
present time in Canada, it is possible for victims to apply at the time
of sentencing under section 65 3 of the Criminal Code for compensation for loss or damage to property. In addition, under section
446.2 of the Code, the Court may order the restitution of property
obtained by the commission of the offence if such property is
"before the Court"; for example, if it has been lawfully seized
during investigation. These provisions are significantly limited,
since awards are limited to property loss and the Court is precluded
from awarding compensation for "pain and suffering" or "injured
feelings" .101 In addition, the criminal court will not entertain applications for compensation if the claim is disputed or unduly
complex. 102
Realizing the limited applicability of these supplementary
sentencing provisions, most provincial jurisdictions have enacted
victim compensation schemes that allow victims to apply for compensation, whether or not the offender has been apprehended and
successfully prosecuted. The scheme in Ontario allows for compensation for injury or loss up to an amount of $25,000. 103 Not only is
it extremely rare for a victim to receive the maximum award, but
any award is to be decreased in light of any other benefit or
compensation received, 104 and in light of the Board's assessment of
the victim's behaviour "that may have directly or indirectly contributed to his death or injury". 105 Despite the best intentions of the
governments, most compensatory schemes have been condemned
as inefficient and limited vehicles for compensation. 106 Some com10 l. R. v. Groves (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 65, 39 C.R.N.S. 366 (Ont. H.C.); R. v.
Farley, (1976] W.W.D. 128 (Man. CA).
102. R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 at 963-964, 41 C.C.C. (2d) 97 at 113; R.
v. O'Reilly, Ont. C.A., June 21, 1984.
103. Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 82, as am. S.O.
1986, c. 37.
104. Ibid., s. 17(3).
105. Ibid., s. 17(1).
106. Note 2, above.
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mentators have gone so far as to suggest that these compensation
schemes are mere political palliatives that mask the state's lack of
concern for victims.101
It is unfair to cast aspersions upon state efforts to assist victims
in this way, since compensation schemes are merely a small part of
official responses to a victim's needs. In addition to compensation
schemes, there are victim-witness programs, social service referral
programs, crisis intervention programs, victim advocacy programs
and victim-offender mediation programs. 108 Recently Manitoba
passed legislation creating a victim's Bill ofRights 109 to ensure that
victims are notified of developments in the prosecution and are
afforded limited rights of participation in the process. At a minimum, it can be said that the state is sincere in its efforts to assist,
but, as might be expected, it is unwilling to invest needed funds to
transform its sincere wishes into effective programs. If funding is
the major obstacle to effective assistance, then there is all the more
reason for the state to tap into the windfall publishing profits of
criminals.
The importance of the state objective of compensating victims
cannot be gainsaid. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada
has commented:
Recognition of the victim's needs underlies at the same time the larger
social interest inherent in the individual victim's loss. Thus, social values
are reaffirmed through restitution to victims. Society gains from restitution in other ways as well. To the extent that restitution works towards selfcorrection, and prevents or at least discourages the offender's commitment
to a life of crime, the community enjoys a measure of protection, secu~ty
and savings. Depriving offenders of the fruits of their crimes or ensunng
that offenders assist in compensating victims for their losses should assist
in discouraging criminal activity. Ho

The compelling interest in compensating victims has been noted in
most jurisdictions, to the extent that in 1983 the Council of Europe
enacted the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime to ensure that all signatory nations estab107. Elias, note 2, above.
I 08. Elias, note 2, above, at pp. 297-299; Federal/Provincial Task Force, note 4,
above, at pp. 7 5-8 l.
109. Justice for Victims Act, S.M. 1986, c. J40, C.C.S.M. J40.
110. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Restitution and Compensation
(1974), pp. 7-8.

58

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[4 1.P.J.]

lished minimum requirements to meet theneedsofvictims.111 The
government of Canada has recently escalated its efforts to assist
victims by announcing its intention to inject some 16 million
dollars into provincial compensation schemes, and to enact legislation that requires offenders, upon sentencing, to pay a fine surcharge that will be deposited in a provincial fund set up for victim
compensation. 112 The compelling state objective may be praised by
all, but is it of sufficient weight to allow for the violation of freedom
of expression?
It might be argued that this praiseworthy objective cannot
thwart the guarantee of constitutional rights because the rights of
victims are not constitutionally enshrinedm and surely a wellentrenched constitutional right outweighs a mere entitlement to
compensation. This is a specious argument because the balancing
that must be undertaken under section 1 of the Charter does not
presuppose a weighing of commensurate constitutional rights.
There may be cases in which a section 1 analysis will require a
balancing of constitutional rights (for example, freedom of the
press under section 2 versus the right to a fair trial under section
l l(d)), but, in most cases, what is contemplated by the section 1
limitation upon rights is the balancing of rights as offset by wellrecognized and approved state objectives. In examining the constitutionality of random police inspections of cars at spot checks (for
example, the R.I.D.E. (Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere) program), the courts posit as the pressing state objective the maintenance of highway safety, and this objective is accepted despite the
absence of any well-entrenched right of owners and drivers of
automobiles. 114
A derivation of the argument that victims' rights are more
properly characterized as mere entitlements is the argument that
111. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on
the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime (Strasbourg: Council of
Europe, Publishing Section, 1984).
112. Note 4, above.
113. Two cases have drawn significant conclusions from the exclusion of the
victi.m from the terms of the Charter: see Chartrand v. Quebec (Min. of
Justice) (1986), 55 C.R. (3d) 97 (Que. S.C.); Hamilton v. R. (1986), 30
C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C. S.C.).
114. See R. v. Ladouceur (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 688, 57 C.R. (3d) 45 (Ont. C.A.);
Iron v. R. (1987), 55 C.R. (3d) 289 (Sask. C.A.).
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compensatory awards to victims are made ex gratia and that there
is no obligation on the state to provide such awards. Accordingly, it
would be anomalous to impair constitutional rights solely to render
effective an imperfect obligation. Once again, this argument misses
the mark because most state objectives, such as maintaining highway safety, are not obligatory undertakings. In any event, a cogent
counter-argument can be made that victim assistance is a state
obligation because the state has a duty to protect its citizens from
criminal injury:
One of the primary and most important duties ofgovernment is to provide
for the physical safety of those under its jurisdiction, and, failing that, for
the successful prosecution of those who infringe on that safety. Similarly,
one ofthe mostimportantrightsofall inhabitantsofagiven political entity
is to receive protection .... While the government cannot do the impossible and should not be considered to be an insurer, it should be held
responsible in attempting to fulfill its duties of protection and
prosecution. 115

The proper resolution of the balancing of the right to free
expression and the right to compensation for crime is problematic,
and, no doubt, reasonable people will strike the balance differently.
In my view, we need not resolve this issue because the Son of Sam
laws do not satisfy the other requirements of section 1 ofthe Charter
as a result of disproportionality and the availability ofless restrictive means to achieve the state objective. First, one must question
why it is that publishing profits have been singled out as the only
source offunds to be made available to victims. Publishing profits
may be a likely source of revenue, but there is no reason why the
legislation should not demand that all persons who contract with an
incarcerated offender be required to deposit the funds in the escrow
account for the benefit of victims.
Second, one must recognize that the entire legislation is premised upon a successful civil suit by the victim. Son of Sam laws do
not purport to create a new cause of action, nor do they allow
victims access to funds without first showing their entitlement
through a successful suit. In effect, the legislation is merely providing a mechanism for enforcing judgments out of a fund generated
115. R. Aynes, "Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility
and the Right Not to be a Victim" (1983-84), 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 63 at
115-116.
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by the exercise of free speech rights. One must therefore inquire
into whether existing enforcement mechanisms are deficient in
protecting the rights of victims. The mechanisms in place under the
Rules of Practice may have noticeable deficiencies, 11 6 but the
provisions for seizure and sale and garnishment of wagesm are at
least adequate against a debtor who is not indigent. Of course, the
motivation for creating Son of Sam laws has been the realization
that most offenders are indigent; yet there are offenders who may
happen upon windfall profits later in life.
The ordinary civil process for executing judgments against
debtors who are penniless, but who have future potential for profit,
is seriously flawed. Creditors may be able to make use of Jtfareva
injunctions, 118 and there is case law suggesting that the Attorney
General mayo btain an injunction on behalf of a victim restraining
the offender from dissipating current assets.11 9 However, once
again, these mechanisms are only effective against existing funds,
and for potential sources of wealth in the future the creditor must
rely upon periodic examination of the debtor120 to determine if
there are any changes in his wealth that may be subject to execution. The procedure is completely "hit and miss" and is an ineffective method for securing victim compensation.
The current problems in enforcing judgments may justify a
special procedure for a special class of creditor, the victim ofcrime.
However, it is possible to achieve the objective of effective victim
compensation without triggering the constitutional problems inherent in Son of Sam legislation. This can be done by adopting the
notification requirements already present in the impugned legisla116. For a discussion of some of the problems relating to enforcement of debts,
see Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Enforcement of
Judgement Debts & Related Matters (1981).
117. Rules of Civil Procedure, 0. Reg. 560/84, s. 60.07 (seizure and sale), s.
60.08 (garnishment).
118. For cases detailing the preconditions for the use of this special interlocutory
injunction, see Chitel v. Rothbart (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (Ont. C.A.);
Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 97 (S.C.C.);
see also, D. McAllister, Mareva Injunctions, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1987).
l 19. A.G. Ontario v. Stranges (1984), 46 O.R. (2d)452, 12 C.C.C. (3d)455 (Ont.
H.C.); affirmed 47 0.R. (2d) 348, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 575.
120. Note 117, above, s. 60.18. The Rules of Practice allow for one examination
of the debtor per year (or more with leave of the court).
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tion, so that anyone contracting with an incarcerated offender must
notify the court or an administrative board of the contract, and, in
tum, the victim will be notified of the potential source of funds. If
the legislature believes that there is still the danger of funds being
dissipated, notwithstanding the notification, then the ordinary
methods of execution can be supplemented by requiring the contracting party to deposit all funds in an escrow account. The escrow
account still poses a constitutional problem ·with respect to publishing profits. However, the section 1 Charter argument, based upon
the compelling objective of assisting victims, should be sustained if
the funds in the escrow account are derived from all types of
contracts, to forestall the contention that the establishment of an
escrow fund has a disproportionate impact upon individuals exercising their rights of free expression.

5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Many people may dismiss Son of Sam laws as simply a necessary evil in a country such as the United States, where crass commercialism is rampant, and where any person with initiative can
profit from the most despicable endeavours. Such naivete cannot
be taken seriously. The rise of the criminal as successful literary
figure may have been accelerated in the United States due to the
presence of the life story fee contract; but the serial killer as literary
hero is not a product of any particular time or place. The great
success of Roger Caron's book, Go Boy, and of works detailing the
exploits of Peter Demeter or Helmut Buxbaum, 121 indicates that
there is a substantial market for criminal authors. It can be noted in
passing that members of society are not innocent and passive
observers of the injustice of criminals profiting from publication.
Society is an active accomplice to this injustice, which would not
occur if we restrained our appetite for consuming stories that
sordidly describe crimes and other cruelties.
This paper has, it is hoped, shown that any attempts by lawmakers to redistribute publishing profits for the benefit of victims is
121. G. Jonas, By Persons Unknown: The Strange Death of Christine Demeter
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977). Immediately after the conviction
of Helmut Buxbaum for the murder ofhis wife, three books appeared in the
market: Chip Martin, Buxbaum: A Murderous Affair (1986); T. Bissland,
Buxbaum (1986); H. Bird, Conspiracy to Murder (1986).
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subject to constitutional infirmity in Canada. Such schemes cannot
be justified on the basis that prisoners are not competent to be
rights-bearers, because it is quite clear that the protection of the
Charter does not end at the prison gate. Similarly, no justification
can be found in the laudable objectives of compensating victims or
denying offenders the profits of crime. Both these justifications fall
short of being reasonable limits prescribed by law, because they
both suffer from the flaw of having a disproportionate impact on
the right of free speech. Perhaps it may be argued that, standing
alone, each justification is flawed, but that the synergistic combination of both should cure whatever flaw is inherent in either standing
alone. It may be argued that publication profits that cannot be
considered an unjust enrichment, because of a remote causal connection between wrongdoing and profit, may still be stripped on the
basis that the state has a pressing obligation to make the victim
whole, and that any profits that cannot be properly channelled to
victims may still be forfeited by falling back upon an unjust enrichment claim. This argument raises the novel and suspect constitutional proposition that two flawed justifications for infringement
become magically transformed into one coherent and flawless
justification.
Before victims of crime jump on the bandwagon calling for
restrictions on the ability ofthe criminal to profit from publications
of re-enactments, they should remember that:
The scrupulous and the just, the noble, humane and devoted natures, the
unselfish and the intelligent, may begin a movement - but it passes away
from them. They are not leaders of a revolution. They are its victims. 122

The advancement of Son of Sam laws as a vehicle for furthering
victims' rights has the potential for making the compensated victim
a victim of another kind. By deterring the dissemination of valuable
insights into the behaviour of dangerous individuals, all victims are
denied the opportunity of having information made available that
will help them understand what led to their victimization in the first
place.

122. The words of Joseph Conrad as quoted in W.H. Auden and L. Kronenberger, Aphorisms: A Personal Selection (Harrisonburg: Penguin, 1985) p.
310.

